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Beerly: Beerly: Attorney's Thoughts Remain Inviolate:

An Attorney's Thoughts Remain Inviolate:
The Missouri Supreme Court Protects

Intangible Work Product
State ex rel.Atchison, Topeka & SantaFe R , Co. v. O'Malley'
I. INTRODUCTION
The work product rule provides that the tangible and intangible results of
an attorney's trial preparation are protected from discovery. 2 This protection

extends to the thoughts, mental impressions and opinions of an attorney, as well
as to trial preparation materials However, Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
56.01(b)(4), which sets out the work product rule, refers
only to "documents and
4
tangible things" prepared in anticipation of litigation.
In 1993, two Missouri appellate courts considered whether intangible work
product is protected in Missouri and reached opposite conclusions.5 In State ex
rel. Krigbawn v. Lemon, the Eastern District Court of Appeals held that the work
product doctrine only protects those documents or tangible things protected by
the rule.' The Western District Court of Appeals, in State ex rel. State Boardof
Pharmacyv. Otto, held that intangible work product is protected from discovery
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor.7
In State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. O'Malley,8 the
Missouri Supreme Court clarified the Missouri work product rule, overruling
Krigbaum and embracing the Otto protection of intangible work product.9
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Charles Herriman sued Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company

("Santa Fe") under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,"0 seeking damages for

1. 898 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1995).
2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

3. Id. at511.
4. Mo. S. CT. R. 56.01(b)(4).

5. State ex rel. Krigbaum v. Lemon, 854 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State ex
rel. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Otto, 866 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
6. Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d. at 73.
7. Otto, 866 S.W.2d at 483 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
8. 898 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1995).
9. Id. at 553.
10. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
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personal injuries suffered while working for Santa Fe." In his first set of
interrogatories, Herriman asked whether Santa Fe had obtained any statements
or reports from any person regarding the accident or Herriman's claimed
injuries. 2 Herriman also asked for the names of persons from whom the
statements or reports were obtained, whether the statements were oral or written
and the date and present location of the statements or reports. 3
In partial compliance with the request, Santa Fe produced copies of medical
records, documents and statements obtained from Herriman and his physician
and identified all known individuals with knowledge of relevant facts. 4 Santa
Fe objected to the-emainder of the request, claiming that it sought privileged
intangible work product."
Herriman sought an order compelling Santa Fe to answer the
interrogatories 6 from Circuit Judge John R. O'Malley. 7 Judge O'Malley
ordered Santa Fe to comply with the discovery requests, and Santa Fe sought
writs of prohibition and mandamus from the Missouri Supreme Court. 8

11. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 551.
12. Id. at 553.
13. Id. The interrogatories in question read as follows:
3. Have any statements or reports been obtained from any persons, including
physicians or hospitals, regarding the occurrence or injuries described in
Plaintiff's Petition?
4. If so, name the persons from whom the statements or reports have been
obtained, the date of said statements or reports, the number ofsaid statements
or reports, whether oral or written, to who[m] said statements or reports were
made and the location of said statements or reports at the present time.
6. State whether any statements were taken pertaining to the occurrence
mentioned in Plaintiff's Petition, either signed or unsigned, recorded by court
reporter or stenographer. If so, state:
(a) when said statements were taken;
(b) who took said statement;
(c) where said statements were taken;
(d) who was present at the time said statements were taken;
(e) who gave said statements; and
(f) who currently has possession of said statements.
Id
14. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 551.
17. Id. The Honorable John R. O'Malley serves on the Circuit Court of Jackson
County and was the respondent in Santa Fe's petition for writs of prohibition and
mandamus.
18. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 551.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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In a unanimous decision, written by Judge Elwood Thomas, 9 the court

clarified Missouri work product doctrine, holding that the interrogatories sought
work product and that Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01 "does not alter or
abrogate the protections of intangible work product, which exist independently
of Rule 56.01(b)(3)."2'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In their original form, the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
specifically limit a party's access to an opposing attorney's mental impressions2
or documents developed in the course of his opponent's trial preparation. 1
Courts disagreed about the extent to which such inquiry could be made.' The
United States Supreme Court, in Hickman v. Taylor,' created a qualified
immunity from discovery for attorney work product prepared in anticipation of
litigation.24
A. Work ProductDoctrine Created: Hickman v. Taylor
and FederalRule of Civil Procedure26(b)(3)
The Hickman case arose after a tugboat accident in which five of nine crew
members, including Norman Hickman, drowned.' Shortly after the accident, an
attorney for the tugboat company interviewed and took statements from the
survivors and other potential witnesses.26

19. Before his appointment to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1991, Judge Thomas
taught evidence at the University of Missouri-Columbia Law School from 1965 to 1978.
Judge Thomas died in 1996 after a lengthy battle with Parkinson's disease. O'Malley

was Judge Thomas' last evidence case.
For more information about Judge Thomas, see Timothy J. Heinz, A Tribute to
Judge Thomas, 61 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1996).

20. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553.
21. See Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Rethinking Work Product,77 VA. L. REv. 1515,
1518 (1991); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2021 (2d ed. 1994).
22. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2021 nn.2-9.

23. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
24. Id at 511-12. For a general discussion of work product doctrine, see John A.
Anderson et al., Project, The Work ProductDoctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760 (1983).

For a discussion of the work product doctrine in Missouri, see Larry L. McMullen &
Robin V. Foster, Work Productin Missouri, 50 Mo. L. REV. 563 (1985).
25. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498.
26. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Four of the five potential claims were settled; the administrator of
Hickman's estate brought suit in a federal court under the Jones Act.27 The
plaintiff filed several interrogatories directed to the tug owners, one of which
asked the owners to identify and produce all statements from crew members of
any vessel taken in connection with the accident, including summaries of oral
statements.28 The tug owners objected to the interrogatory on the grounds that
it called for "privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation" and that
answering "would involve practically turning over not only the complete files,
but also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts of counsel. 29
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the
requested matters were not privileged and ordered the tug owners and their
attorney to answer the interrogatories, produce all written statements of
witnesses, produce all memoranda containing statements of fact by witnesses
and state any fact concerning the case which the defendants learned through oral
statements by witnesses.3" Upon their refusal, the court judged the defendants
and their attorney in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they
complied.3' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
information sought was part of the "work product of the lawyer" and privileged
from discovery.32
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, but used a slightly different
analysis.33 The Court noted that federal rules of discovery are premised on the
idea that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation," and "either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession."34 The Court said that the
information sought did not fall within the scope of attorney-client privilege, but
went beyond the intended scope of discovery." The plaintiff "made more than

27. Id.
28. Id. at 498-99. The interrogatory read:
State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs "J.M.
Taylor" and "Philadelphia" or of any other vessel were taken in connection
with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug "John M. Taylor."
Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set
forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports.
Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 499-500 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Penn. 1945)).
Id. at 500.
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1946).
Hiclnan,329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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non-privileged facts in the possession of his
an ordinary request for relevant,
36
adversaries or their counsel.
The request reached into a lawyer's work as "an officer of the court...
bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the
rightful interests of his clients," and the Court said that it was essential that this
work be done "with a certain degree of privacy."37
This work is reflected, of course, in the interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless
other tangible and intangible ways... Were such materials open to opposing
counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.
The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests
of the clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served. 8
The Hiclman court took the middle ground between the district court,
which proposed free discovery of work product, and the court of appeals, which
called the material privileged.39 The Court created a qualified immunity from
discovery for written materials obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation,
explaining that the materials may be discoverable if the party seeking discovery
can "establish adequate reasons to justify production."4 Disclosure might be
required, for example, where relevant facts are hidden in an attorney's file or
where witnesses are no longer available or are difficult to reach. 4 Noting that
the plaintiff could obtain all material, non-privileged facts through normal
discovery methods, the Court denied production.42
The Court applied a different rule to the oral statements made by witnesses
to the defendants' lawyer, because disclosure of these statements would require
the attorney to produce his recollection and impressions of the witnesses'
statements. This '4intangible
type of work product would only be discoverable in
"rare situations." 3 The Court said, "[W]e do not believe that any showing of
necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case to justify production

36. Id.
37. Id. at 510.
38. Id. at 511.
39. See WRIGHT ETAL., supranote 21, § 2022.

40.
41.
42.
43.

Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.
Id.
Id at513.
Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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...If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these matters,
petitioner's case is not of that type.""
In 1970, the Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to include a specific discovery exemption for trial preparation materials. 45
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the Hickman "substantial
need" rule' and protects from discovery "documents and tangible things...
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial or for another party or by or for
that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."47 These "documents and tangible things"
'48
are available only upon a showing of "substantial need.
The federal rule, which has been followed by Missouri 9 and most other
states,5" specifically protects only tangible trial preparation materials. The rule
indicates that intangible work product should not be disclosed freely,5' but the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Id.
Mo. S. CT.R. 56.01(b)(4).

50. Thirty-four states have adopted verbatim copies of Rule 26(b)(3), and 10 others
have rules very similar to the federal rule. Verbatim copies include: ALA. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); AIz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); ARK. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3);
COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); DEL. CT.C.P.R. 26(b)(3); FLA.R. CIv. P. 1.280(b)(3); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-1 1-26(b)(3); HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); IND. R. TRIAL PRAc. 26(b)(3);
IOWA R. Civ. P. 122(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(b)(3); Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.03(3); ME.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); MASS. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); MONT. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3); NEB. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); NEv. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); N.H. SUPER. CT.R.
35(b)(2); N.J. CIV. PRAC. R. 4:10-2(c); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-026(b)(4); N.D. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3); OR. R. Civ. P. 35(13)(3); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); S.D. COD. LAws ANN. § 15-626(b)(3); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); VT. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3);
VA. S. CT.R. 4:1(b)(3). WASH. SUPER. CT.Civ. R. 26(b)(3); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3);

Wis. R. Civ. P. 804.01(2)(c); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Similar state rules include: CONN. SUPER. CT.R. 219; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1424; MD. CIR. CT.R. Civ. P. 2-402(c) & (d); MICH. R.

Civ. P. 26.02(c); MINN.R. Civ. P. 26.02(c); MO. S. CT.R. 56.01(b)(3); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1A-1, R. 26(b)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 3226(B)(2); R.I. SUPER. CT.R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2). See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 2023 nn.27-28.
For a description of the provisions of the courts in the remaining six states, see
Thornburg, supra note 21, at 1583 n.31.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) reads:
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinion or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of a party concerning the litigation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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extent of the protection of intangible work product under the rule is not clear.
in their interpretation of the rule's protection of intangible
Courts have varied
2
product.1
work
B. Protectionof Intangible Work Productin the FederalCourts
Prior to the enactment of Rule 26(b)(3), the courts focused on whether the
53
proposed discovery fit within the facts of Hickman v. Taylor. The post-rule
decisions contain conflicting interpretations of the rule as it applies to intangible
work product. Several post-rule cases have held that work product protection
54
extended only to "documents and tangible things" specified in Rule 26(b)(3).
5
In Lincoln Gateway Realty Company v. Carri-Craft,Inc.," the court considered
an interrogatory which, with respect to certain statements taken by the plaintiff
and identified in a previous interrogatory, asked for the date the statement was
taken, the identity of the person who obtained the statement from the witness,
56
and the identity of his or her employer at the time the statement was taken. The
plaintiff contended that the interrogatory sought trial preparation materials within
the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). The court said that the
information was clearly within the scope of discovery because trial preparation
7
materials are limited to "documents and tangible things" in Rule 26(b)(3).

52. See infranotes 53-114.
53. Holding that proposed discovery was proper: Klop v. United Fruit Co., 18
F.R.D. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that interrogatory seeking names of people
from whom plaintiff had obtained statement was proper because Hickman concerned
statements prepared by the attorney, not the names of the persons from whom statements
had been taken); Seven-Up Co. v. Get Up Corp., 30 F.R.D. 550, 553 (N.D. Ohio 1962)
(holding that interrogatories requesting names of interviewees, dates of interviews and
questions asked by interviewer did not come within Hickman rule, because they were not
"written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections" prepared by the
opposing attorney).
Holding that proposed discovery was improper: Besley-Welles Corp. v. Ballax,
Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (Interrogatory seeking names and addresses of all
persons contacted as possible witnesses went beyond proper inquiry about names of
people with knowledge of relevant facts and invaded protected work product.);
Cunningham v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 11 F.R.D. 331 (E.D.N.Y.) (same);
Uinta Oil Refining Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495 (D. Utah 1964); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
54. See Lincoln Gateway Realty Co. v. Carri-Craif Inc., 53 F.R.D. 303, 307 (W.D.
Mo. 1971); Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186, 200 (D. Kan. 1996).
55. 53 F.R.D. 303, 307 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
56. Id.
57. Id. See also Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186 (D. Kan. 1996) (held that
interrogatory did not seek work product, because did not seek documents or tangible
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Some courts have upheld similar interrogatories on the grounds that a party
must reveal the identities of individuals with knowledge of relevant facts.5 8
These courts said that interrogatories seeking the names of individuals from
whom a party had taken statements were no more than attempts to identify
individuals with knowledge of the relevant facts. 9 The courts said that a party
was entitled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) to obtain
'6
information as to "the existence, [and] description... of any... documents. 0
On the other hand, most courts and commentators have interpreted Rule
26(b)(3) as a limitation to protection of trial preparation materials, not an
abrogation of the protection provided by Hickman for intangible work product. 61
The courts have also distinguished between interrogatories seeking the identity
of individuals with knowledge of facts and interrogatories seeking the names of
individuals who have been interviewed or who will be called as witnesses. 62
In Massachusettsv. FirstNationalSupermarkets, Inc.,63 the court held that
an interrogatory requesting the names and addresses of interviewees improperly
sought protected work product.' The court said that Rule 26(b)(3) only protects
"documents and tangible things," but the Supreme Court's holding in Hickman
6
v. Taylor protected intangible work product from discovery. 1
In Board of Education of Evanston v. Admiral Heating and Ventilating,
Inc.,' the court considered an interrogatory asking defendants to identify anyone
they had interviewed concerning construction bids and to describe the
circumstances of the interview.6' The court said that a party may properly
"inquire into the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts," but "may not do so in a fashion that effectively infringes upon the
opposing attorney's preparation of his case for trial. '68 According to the court,
things as specified in Rule 26(b)(3)).
58. Ballard v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Chatman
v. American Export Lines, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
59. Ballard,45 F.R.D. at 369; Chatman,20 F.R.D. at 178.
60. Ballard, 45 F.R.D at 369; Chatman, 20 F.R.D. at 178 (citing Jones v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 662, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1947)).
61. See infra notes 63-65. See also Special Project, The Work ProductDoctrine,
68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 841 (1983); Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the
Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1300-01 (1969).
62. See infra notes 66-69.
63. 112 F.R.D. 149 (D.Mass. 1986).
64. Id. at 152.
65. Id,
66. 104 F.R.D. 23 (N.D. Il. 1984).
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. See also Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438 (D. Nev. 1987); Hoffman
v. United Telecomm., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 436 (D. Kan. 1987); United States v. Maryland
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 51 F.R.D. 159 (D. Md. 1970).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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the interrogatory in question was such an infringement. It was legitimate to ask
for identification of persons who had knowledge of the relevant facts. However,
[t]o go beyond that-to tell plaintiffs whom defendants have interviewed,
where and when such interviews took place and whether or not a record was
made-is to give plaintiffi no more knowledge of substantive relevant facts,
but rather to afford them the potential for significant insights into the defense
lawyers' preparation of their case (and thus their mental processes).6 9
The two conflicting lines of federal cases have created confusion not only in the
federal courts, but at the state level as well.7"
C. Protectionof Intangible Work Product in Missouri
Like the federal rule, Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01 explicitly
protects only tangible work product.7 Missouri courts, like their federal
counterparts, have interpreted the rule in a variety of ways.72

69. Admiral, 104 F.R.D. at 32.
70. See infra notes 73-115 and accompanying text.
71. Mo. S. CT. R. 56.01(b)(3). Part (b) ofthe rule provides in pertinent part:
(b) Scope of discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the Court in
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter ....
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials . . . [A] party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under 56.01(b)(1) and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative, including an attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent, only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the case and that the adverse party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
72. See infranotes 73-115 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Even after Hickman, Missouri courts often relied on protections other than
the work product doctrine to protect intangible work product. Three years after
the United States Supreme Court decided Hickman, the Missouri Supreme Court
3
decided State ex rel.Miller'sMutual FireInsuranceAssociation v. Caruthers."
In Caruthers, the court considered the propriety of interrogatories asking
whether the party had investigated the plaintiff, the purpose of any investigation,
the instructions to investigators and the names and addresses of all persons
interviewed. In holding that the interrogatories were improper, the court relied
on a line of cases which did not allow interrogatories to inquire about
information that the party could know only through hearsay. 4 The court did not
mention work product in relation to the list of interviewees, but it did note that
the interrogatory requesting the purpose of any investigation and the instructions
to investigators sought information protected by the Hickman work product
doctrine.7"
In State ex rel. St. Louis Public Service Company v. McMillian,76 the
Missouri Supreme Court again prevented the discovery of an opposing party's
investigative process, this time using a pragmatic rationale. The Court
considered whether a plaintiff s interrogatory could ask whether the defendant
had taken photographs of the plaintiff since her injury.7 The court did not allow
the interrogatory, because any photographs would be privileged work product,
and the plaintiffwould not be able to obtain them. 8 The court held that "[w]here
the sole purpose of an inquiry is to procure the production of material which, if
it is in existence at all, is privileged, we see no legitimate purpose in permitting
the inquiry and prolonging the controversy."79

73. 226 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
74. Id at 713 (citing State ex reL Williams v. Buzard, 190 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. 1945)
(en bane); State ex rel. Thompson v. Hanis, 195 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1946) (en banc); State
ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dowan, 203 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1947) (en bane)).
See also State ex rel. Premier Panels, Inc. v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App.
1966).
Prior to Hickman, some federal courts used a similar rationale. See generally
WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 21, § 2008.
75. State ex rel. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Caruthers, 226 S.W.2d 711, 713
(Mo. 1950) (en banc).
76. 351 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1961).
77. Id.
at 25.
78. Id.
79. Id See also State ex reL Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925,
927 (Mo. 1993) (Interrogatory inquiring about existence of surveillance reports held
improper because there was no "legitimate purpose in the inquiry, aside from the
production of privileged material.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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The Missouri Supreme Court explicitly recognized protection for intangible
work product in State ex rel. Gray v. Jensen. °

The court held that an

interrogatory asking for the names and addresses of all doctors that the plaintiff
planned to call to testify was improper because it sought information that was
protected work product.8 The court said that the interrogatory went
beyond a request for those who have knowledge. It invades the area of
judgment and trial strategy as to which persons actually will be used as

witnesses. This usually will be governed by the opinion and advice of trial
counsel. To require an answer to this inquiry would be to invade the work

product12 of counsel and the privileged relationship between attorney and
client.
D. Conflicting Decisions: State ex rel. Krigbaum v. Lemon
and State ex rel. State Board ofPharmacyv. Otto
In 1993, protection of intangible work product was considered by both the
Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals and Western District Court of
Appeals. The two courts virtually ignored the sparse and conflicting Missouri
cases, looking instead to federal precedent and coming to directly contradictory
decisions. In State ex rel. Krigbaum v. Lemon,83 the Eastern District Court of
Appeals compelled a party to answer an interrogatory that requested the names
of all persons from whom the plaintiff and her attorney had received statements.
The court said that the information sought was not protected work product." A
few months later, the Western District Court of Appeals held in State ex reL
State Board ofPharmacyv. Otto85 that a similar interrogatory improperly sought
information protected by the work product doctrine. 6

In Krigbaum, the defendants in a personal injury action served an
interrogatory on the plaintiff requesting the names and addresses of all persons
from whom the plaintiff or her attorney had received statements. Over the
objection of the plaintiff, the trial judge88 entered an order compelling the

80. 395 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
81. Id. at 145-46.
82. Id. at 146.
83. 854 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

84. Idat 73.
85. State ex rel. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Otto, 866 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App.

1993).
86. Id. at 482-85.
87. Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d at 73. The interrogatory in question also requested the

date of the statement, the person who took the statement, the form and location of the
statement, and the person presently having custody or control of the statement. Id.
88. The ruling complained of was made by Judge Carroll Blackwell. The case was
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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plaintiff to answer the interrogatory, and the plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition
from the court of appeals.89
The court of appeals denied the writ, holding that the request was
authorized by Rule 56.01.10 Looking to the language of Rule 56.01(b)(3), the
court stated that "[tio be protected as work product, or 'Trial Preparation:
Materials,' the materials must be 'documents' or 'tangible things."' 9 The court
found that the request was clearly authorized by Rule 56.01, because the
defendants did not ask for documents or tangible things or the contents of the
statements, but only asked about the existence of the documents or tangible
things.92
The court said that the language of 56.01(b)(1) directly refuted the
plaintiffs claim of work product protection.93 Rule 56.01(b)(1) permits the
discovery of "the existence, description, nature, custody, and location of
documents or other tangible things" and the "identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter."94 According to the court, the
information sought fell within the scope of 56.01(b)(1).
The court stated that its position requiring disclosure was supported by
federal precedent, citing the statement in Lincoln Gateway Realty that work
product protection is limited to "documents and tangible things."9 The court
also relied on Chatman v. American Export Lines, Inc., which held that
interrogatories seeking the names of individuals from whom a party had taken
statements were no more than a proper attempt to identify individuals with
knowledge of the relevant facts.96
The Western District Court of Appeals faced the same issue a few months
later in State ex rel. State Board of Pharmacyv. Otto, and held that a similar
interrogatory sought information that was protected work product.97 The Otto
case involved a complaint filed before the Administrative Hearing Commission
by the State Board of Pharmacy in an action to discipline a Missouri

subsequently assigned to Judge James Lemon. Id.at 73 n.1.
89. Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d at 73.

90. Id.
at 73-74.
91. Id. at 73 (citing Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Spinden, 798
S.W.2d 472,477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) and Enke v. Anderson, 733 S.W.2d 462,466 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987)).
92. id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
at 73-74.
95. Id.
at 74 (citing Lincoln Gateway Realty Co. v. Carri-Craft, Inc., 53 F.R.D.
303,307 (W.D. Mo. 1971)).
96. Chatman v. American Export Lines, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

97. State ex reL State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Otto, 866 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
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pharmacist.9 In preparation for trial, the board's attorney conducted interviews,
reviewed documents and prepared notes and memoranda. 99
The defendant pharmacist served an interrogatory on the board requesting
details of the board's investigation of the pharmacist, including the names of the
persons contacted and detailed descriptions of statements and documents
obtained." The board objected to the interrogatory on the ground that it sought
information which constituted opinion work product. 01 After the trial court
overruled the objection and ordered the board to comply, the board sought a writ
of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cole County."0 2 The circuit court upheld
the trial court's order, and the board appealed to the Western District Court of
Appeals. 03
The Otto court, unlike the Krigbaum court, recognized work product
protection for both tangible trial preparation materials and intangible work
product."°4 Protection for trial preparation materials, the court explained, comes

98. Id. at 481.
99. Id.
100. The interrogatory in question stated:
9. Whether or not you have conducted or have cause [sic] to be conducted
any investigation or further investigation of Respondent, James E. Drake,
after the inspection of April 4, 1988 of Drake's Medical Center Pharmacy,
and if so state:
A. Identify each person conducting each such investigation or
further investigation on your behalf;
B. Describe in detail each such investigation or further
investigation;
C. Identify each person contacted during each such investigation
or further investigation the date of each such contract [sic] and
identify each person acting on your behalf who contacted each
such person on each such date;
D. Describe in detail what each person said on each date when
he/she was contacted and/or interviewed;
E. Describe in detail what was said to each person when he/she
was contacted and/or interviewed on each such date;
F. Identify and describe in detail each document you obtained
during each such investigation or further investigation;
G. Identify the person who provided you with each document
identified in answer to Interrogatory No. 9G [sic] above; and
H. Identify and describe each document prepared during such
investigation or further investigation.
Id. at 482.
101. Otto, 866 S.W.2d at 482.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id (citing Board of Healing Arts v. Spinden, 798 S.W.2d 472, 476-78 (Mo.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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from Rule 56.01(b)(3). '° s The court noted that Rule 56.01(b)(3) "grants no
protection for opinion work product which is not in the form of 'documents or
tangible things." ''' c The protection for intangible opinion work product, the
court said, flows out of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hickman
10 7
v. Taylor.
Like the court in Krigbaum, the Otto court looked to federal case law
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). The court quoted In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979,118 which included an attorney's
pattern of investigation in its definition of work product as "the tangible and
intangible material which reflects an attorney's efforts at investigating and
preparing a case, including one's pattern of investigation, assembling of
information, determination of relevant facts, preparation of legal theories,
planning of strategy, and recording of mental impressions."" 9
The Otto court also adopted the FirstNationalSupermarkets view that:
the basis for not permitting interrogatories to be propounded which seek the
names of persons interviewed by an adverse party is not found in Rule
26(b)(3), F.R. Civ. P., for that rule protects only 'documents and things.'
Rather the basis.., is the Supreme Court's holding in Hickman v. Taylor that
an attorney's 'work-product' is protected against discovery from an adverse
party." 0
Finally, the Otto court also cited Laxalt v. McClatchy," which
distinguished between interrogatories requesting the names of witnesses with
knowledge of relevant facts and interrogatories requesting names of people
interviewed by opposing counsel." 2 The court said that the latter inquiry was
prevented by the work product rule, explaining that disclosure of such
information would allow opposing counsel "to formulate a list of which
witnesses counsel considered important and which were not."' '1 Allowing such
an interrogatory would allow discovery of the very "type of mental impression
' 4
and trial strategy which the work product rule was meant to protect." 1

Ct. App. 1990)).
105. Id. at 483.
106. Id.
107. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
108. 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980).
109. Otto, 866 S.W.2d at 483 (quoting In re GrandJury, 622 F.2d. at 935).
110. Id (quoting Massachusetts v. First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 149,
152 (D. Mass. 1986)).
111. 116 F.R.D. 438 (D. Nev. 1987).
112. Id. at 443.
113. Id.
114. Id (citing Board of Ed. of Evanston v. Admiral Heating and Ventilating, Inc.,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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The Otto court distinguished Krigbaum, saying that the Krigbaum
interrogatory, which asked for names and addresses of persons from whom
statements had been taken, was much narrower than the interrogatory in Otto."5
By distinguishing Krigbaum on its facts, the Otto court avoided direct conflict
with the Eastern District Court of Appeals. However, the divergent analysis of
the two appellate courts was clear, and the stage was set for the Missouri
Supreme Court to resolve the question.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State ex. rel Atchison, Topeka and SantaFe PR. Co. v. O'Malley,"6 the
Missouri Supreme Court explicitly protected intangible work product privilege.
The court first cited Hickman v. Taylor' 7 as "[t]he most important case in the
evolution of the work product doctrine.""' The court then set out the two prongs
of work product doctrine, explaining that work product "consists of both tangible
work product (consisting of trial preparation documents such as written
statements, briefs, and attorney memoranda) and intangible work product
opinions, and legal
(consisting of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
' 9
product.)"
work
opinion
called
theories-sometimes
According to the court, tangible work product is protected by Rule
56.01(b)(3), "which codifies the substantial need rule from Hickman v.
Taylor."'20 The Krigbaum'2 decision was incorrect, the court said, because it
looked to the rule as the sole protection of work product and ignored intangible
work product." The court explained that the rule "represents only half of the
work product doctrine. The rule does not alter or abrogate the protections of
intangible work product which exist independently of Rule 56.01(b)(3)."' The
court, thus, adopted the Otto view of intangible work product as a separate
privilege rooted in Hickman, not in the rule.
The O'Malley court also corrected the Krigbaum court's narrow
interpretation of Rule 56.01(b)(1). The Krigbaum court erred in holding that
rule mandated the disclosure of the existence, nature and custody of the

104 F.R.D. 23, 32 (N.D. III. 1984)).
115. Id. at 483.
116. 898 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1995).

117. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
118. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 552.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
State ex rel. Krigbaum v. Lemon, 854 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553 (citing Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d at 73).

123. Id at 553 (citing State ex rel. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Otto, 866 S.W.2d 480,

483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)).
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witnesses' statements was also error. 24 Work product is considered privileged,
the court explained." z The court said that the rule, which states that a party
"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant.
•. ,"126 clearly places privileged work product outside the scope of permissible
discovery. 127
Applying the law to the facts at hand, the court held that the work product
doctrine protected the requested information. 2 1 The court said the
interrogatories sought "a schematic of the attorney's investigative process"
which "aides [sic] the other attorney not because it reveals facts relevant to the
case, but because it reveals the investigative process and relative weight
29
attributed to certain witnesses' statements by the opposing side."'
Finally, the court noted in dicta that the interrogatories "do, however, ask
for certain information that, as a practical matter, Santa Fe may be required to
disclose."' 30 If Santa Fe were to claim a work product privilege regarding
tangible witnesses' statements, it would have to divulge sufficient information
regarding the witness statements to allow Herriman to assess the applicability of
the privilege.'
The court said that Herriman would have to know which
documents were claimed to be privileged and have sufficient information to
32
evaluate the claim of privilege.
The court suggested that Missouri follow the procedure laid out in the
recently enacted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5). 3 The new federal
rule requires parties to make the claim of privilege expressly and describe the
material in sufficient detail to enable the other party to assess the applicability
of the privilege.13 The court said that the rule "promotes the ever-present aim

124. Id (citing Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d at 73).
125. Id. (citing State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532
(Mo. 1968)).
126. Mo. S. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1).
127. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 554.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
134. Id. The rule provides:

When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules
by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected,
will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or
protection.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/8
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of efficiency in the discovery
process" by reducing the need for in camera
3
inspection of the documents.

1

V. COMMENT
In O'Malley,the Missouri Supreme Court favored a well-reasoned approach
that is faithful to the Hickman concept of work product protection. The
alternative approach followed in Krigbaun is an overly narrow interpretation of
the Missouri rule that fails to protect the mental impressions and legal theories
of an attorney preparing for trial.
Shortly after the federal rules created modem discovery, which some
commentators call "a decidedly nonadversarial process,"' 36 the United States
Supreme Court sought to preserve the adversarial process by protecting an
attorney's thoughts and strategies from opposing counsel. Hickman v. Taylor is
based on belief in the adversarial nature of the American legal system, belief in
the ideal of a lawyer "bound to work for the advancement of justice while
faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients."' 37 As Justice Jackson
wrote in his concurrence in Hickman, "a common law trial is and always should
be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from
the adversary." ' 38

The Hickman court qualified the protection for trial preparation materials,
stating that such materials might be discoverable upon a sufficient showing of
need.' 39 The Court, however, was rather incredulous that intangible work
product such as oral statements taken by an attorney in preparation for trial
would ever be discoverable. 4 ' Any interpretation of subsequent Rule 26(b)(3)
to the effect that intangible work product is not protected surely strays from the
spirit of Hickman.
The approach offered by Krigbawn is an overly narrow interpretation of the
Missouri rule that would fail to protect an attorney's mental impressions. The
courts that have limited work product protection to "documents and tangible
things" have overlooked the Hickman holding that intangible work product is
only discoverable in "rare situations."' 4' In addition, these courts have
overlooked language in both the federal and Missouri rule which requires a court

FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5).
135. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 554.
136. Thornburg, supra note 21, at 1518.
137. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
138. Id.at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
139. Id.at 511-12.

at 513.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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ordering discovery of tangible work product to "protect against disclosure of
mental impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation."'' The rules themselves
clearly provides for protection of intangible work product.
The O'Malley approach is consistent with Hickman v. Taylor, as well as
with Missouri's prior recognition and protection of intangible work product in
Jensen.143 In Jensen, an interrogatory seeking the names of doctors to be called
at trial was improper because "[i]t invades the area of judgment and trial
strategy."'" The interrogatory in O'Malley invaded the area of judgment and
trial strategy by requiring the opposing party to categorize individuals with
knowledge. By requesting the names of the people with knowledge, as well as
the names of people from whom Santa Fe had obtained written or oral
statements, the interrogatory sought to reveal the "investigative process and
relative weight attributed to certain witnesses' statements by the opposing
side."14s
Some commentators advocate eliminating work product protection, arguing
that the protection results in the suppression of relevant evidence and costly
discovery disputes. 46 But even the harshest critics of work product doctrine
have reservations about eliminating the protection of intangible work product.
Professor Thomburg, who attacked the work product doctrine in her article,
Rethinking Work Product, admits concerns about allocating the costs of trial
preparation between parties and preventing attorney harassment should opinion
work product be made discoverable.' 47
Arguments for the elimination of work product protection are part of a
larger proposal for reform of the American legal system. 14 Professor Thomburg

142. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
143. State ex rel. Gray v. Jensen, 395 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1965).
144. Id. at 146.
145. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553.
146. Thornburg, supra note 21, at 1572.
147. Thornburg, supra note 21, at 1572-75. Professor Thornburg advocates
eliminating intangible as well as tangible work product, because preserving the privilege
would undermine any gains (in terms of reducing discovery disputes) that would be
achieved by eliminating tangible work product. Thomburg, supra note 21, at 1572-75.
148. See, e.g., Thomburg, supra note 21, at 1571; Edmund Byrne, The Adversary
System: Who Needs It?, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 204 (Michael Davis &
Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986); Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); John H. Langbein, The GermanAdvantage in
Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System:
Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopular
Dissatisfactionwith the Administration ofJustice, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 729,738-40 (1906);
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional

Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.
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and fellow critics of the work product doctrine argue convincingly for a more
open and cooperative system. 4 9 As long as we remain committed to an
adversarial system, however, protection of intangible work product is necessary
to preserve that system.
After O'Malley,intangible work product is clearly protected from discovery
in Missouri courts. Courts confronted with similar discovery requests will
recognize that information about the investigative process reveals an attorney's
trial strategy and opinions about the relative value of witnesses.
Although O'Malleyresolves any confusion about Missouri's protection of
intangible work product, the court's suggestion that Missouri adopt the privilege
claim procedures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) may be the seed
of future disputes. The rule requires a party claiming tangible work product
protection to make the claim expressly and describe the material "in a manner
that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will50°enable
other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.'
The rule does not contain a standard for the amount, or level of detail, of
information which must be given. The drafters purposely left the standard open,
In the federal courts,
preferring it be decided on a case-by-case basis.'
privilege logs are often skeletal and incomplete and disputes arise about the
proper level of detail in the log. 2 Privilege logs, which were intended to
eliminate the need for in camera inspection of documents, often result in lengthy
disputes and court inspection of the documents.' Without a precise standard,
Missouri courts can probably expect similar disputes.
In addition, the case-by-case standard suggested by the Missouri Supreme
Court may result in disclosure of intangible work product, the very information
the Court protected in O'Malley. A party cannot ask about the existence of
documents, but can frame a motion for production of documents in such a way
that the required privilege log will reveal the same information. A court
applying the new rule might require a party to reveal information about his or her
trial preparation and strategy unnecessarily. The Missouri rule should specify
the information that must be included in a privilege log, as well as information
that it is not required-the names of individuals from whom statements have
been taken, for example.

149. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
151. See Rebecca A. Cochran, EvaluatingFederalRule ofCivil Procedure26(h)(5)
as a Response to Silent and FunctionallySilent Privilege Claims, 13 REv. LrIG. 219,
249 (1994).
152. Id. at231.
153. Id.
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Finally, the O Malley decision may affect Rule 57.01 (c). " This rule allows
"contention interrogatories," which enable a party to discover the facts and
conclusions of counsel that form the basis of the claim.' In Kribaum, the court
said that purely legal conclusions were not discoverable, but that facts and
opinions related to facts may be discovered. 5 6 However, after O'Malley, it
seems clear that such interrogatories seek the thoughts and mental impressions
of the opposing attorney, which are protected opinion work product.
Stating that contention interrogatories aid the discovery process,5 7 the
Krigbaum court overruled State ex rel. PapinBuilders,Inc. v. Litz,5 which had
treated contention interrogatories with marked disfavor.5 9 In Litz, the Missouri
Eastern District Court of Appeals limited the use of contention interrogatories
by setting up a six-factor balancing test to determine whether a contention
interrogatory should be allowed on a case by case basis. '6

154. Rule 57.01(c) provides in relevant part:
An interrogatory is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer
to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or
application of law to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory
need not be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or
until a pretrial conference or other later time.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 57.01(c).
155. State ex rel. Krigbaum v. Lemon, 854 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993),
overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. Co. v.
O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1995).
The interrogatories at issue in O'Malley were not contention interrogatories, so the
portion of Krigbaum dealing with contention interrogatories was not directly overturned.
The O'Malley decision only addressed Krigbaum to the extent that it misinterpreted
intangible work product doctrine. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d at 553.
156. Krigbaum, 854 S.W.2d at 74.
157. Id.
158. 734 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. at 860-61.
160. Id. In order to be proper under Rule 57.01, each of the following questions
regarding an interrogatory must be answered in the affirmative:
(1) Would the answer immediately serve a substantial purpose in framing the
issues;
(2) Would the interrogatory unduly burden the party answering the
interrogatory;
(3) Is the interrogatory a practical and reasonable one;
(4) Does the interrogatory call for the parties' theory of law;
(5) Does the interrogatory involve an ultimate issue or issues in the case;
(6) May the answer to an interrogatory be obtained by a motion to make more
definite.
Id. at 861.
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The Litz court noted that the rationale for allowing contention
interrogatories is rooted in the federal notice pleading system.' Under notice
pleading, the pleadings serve only to give notice of the claim; the discovery
process must be quite liberal so that the parties can discover the underlying
facts. 162 The court said that the rationale made little sense in Missouri, which
follows a fact pleading system63 that requires that the pleadings set out the factual
basis for a claim or defense.1
The reasoning of Litz, supported by the O'Malley decision, makes the future
of contention interrogatories questionable.
Proponents of contention
interrogatories may argue that they are directed at a party and not at an attorney
and, therefore, do not invade an attorney's thoughts and mental impressions."
This distinction seems weak. Legal opinions come from the party's attorney,
and the party cannot refuse to answer an interrogatory on the grounds6that the
information is peculiarly within the knowledge of his or her attomey. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Cou'rt, in Hickman v. Taylor, extended
protection from discovery to both tangible and intangible work product. In State
ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. O'Malley, the Missouri
Supreme Court clarified the Missouri work product rule to ensure that intangible
work product is protected from discovery.
KRISTEN SCOTT BEERLY

161. Id. at 860-61.

162. Id.
163. Id at 858. The court said the proper device to define factual issues is a Rule
55.27(d) motion to make a more definite and certain statement. Id. at 861.
164. Litz, 734 S.W.2d at 861.

165. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947).
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